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I. INTRODUCTION
As early as the discussions leading to the Rome Convention, a major
objection to the full recognition of public performance rights in sound
recordings was the concern that the enforcement efforts of neighboring
rights holders (record producers and musical performers) would interfere
with the efforts of music composers and publishers to maximize the
opportunity to commercially exploit their copyrighted compositions.2 This
concern remains at the heart of opposition to a full public performance right
in the United States. It takes two forms: (1) a concern that neighboring
rights holders will act as gatekeepers, potentially vetoing exploitation
opportunities for the copyrighted compositions embodied in their sound
recordings,3 and (2) a concern that the royalty stream which users must pay
to neighboring rights holders will reduce the royalty stream available to the
owners of copyrighted compositions. Because the owners of composition
copyrights perceive that there is little to gain, and much to lose, if the U.S.
grants full recognition to public performance rights in sound recordings,
they have in many cases actively opposed these rights. If sound recordings
are to receive full performance right protection in the U.S., it is therefore
essential that neighboring rights holders and the owners of musical
composition copyrights find ways in which they can work cooperatively.
This is difficult in an environment where Congress itself has set them at
odds, at first giving everything to one group and nothing to the other, and
then only grudgingly beginning to recognize the rights of the second group.
In other countries, however, performance rights in sound recordings have
managed to coexist with those in compositions; there is no evidence that the
recognition of new rights holders has diminished the well-being of those
who create musical compositions.
1 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 1961 WL 59331, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs-wo024.html [hereinafter Rome
Convention].
2 See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 1220 (2nd ed. 2006)
(citing C. MASOUYE, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 16 ff. (1978)).
3Id. at 1221 (citing MASOUYE, supra note 2, at 17; STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 226 (2d ed. 1989)).
4 Id. (citing STEWART, supra note 3, at 192, 226).
' Id. (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE
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The arguments for and against enacting a full public performance right
for sound recordings have been made elsewhere at length,6 and this article
will not revisit them,7 except for a brief examination, in Part I, of the likely
economic consequences of enacting the expanded right.
Therefore, this article assumes that, in the near future, sound recording
performance rights in the U.S. will be expanded to encompass at least
terrestrial broadcasts (as proposed in the Performance Rights Act (PRA)),
and eventually public venues as well. Spreading the performance right
more broadly creates a larger revenue base, which means that the rates
applicable to each class of user can be lower, which will reduce the burdens
on individual user groups. It will also eliminate - or at least mitigate -
the current problem of giving a competitive advantage to one user group
(e.g., terrestrial radio) over another (e.g., satellite radio and webcasters).
However, once the sound recording public performance right is
expanded beyond its current limits (digital transmissions only), the task of
implementing these rights will become more complex. This article
examines some of the more significant challenges that will accompany this
expansion of the public performance right.
II. COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. The Goal: Reciprocity
One of the most significant benefits of expanding the public performance
right in sound recordings is that it will enable U.S. record companies and
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS, PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCASTING
ORGANIZATIONS, Annexe 1, 28 (1979)).
6 See, e.g., Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in Sound Recordings:
A Policy that Facilitates our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 233 (2007);
William H. O'Dowd, The Need for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 31
Harv. J. on Legis. 249 (1994); John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different
Drummer: Global Harmonization - And the Need for Congress to Get in Step with a Full
Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 1041, 1045-53 (2002); Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R.. 848 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 2d Sess. (2009) (passim).
Suffice it to say that the arguments in favor of the right are far more persuasive. This
conclusion is shared by an overwhelming majority of disinterested experts. For a large
collection of scholarly articles, see Thomas D. Sydnor II, A Performance Right for
Recording Artists: Sound Policy at Home and Abroad, THE PROGRESS AND FREEDOM
FOUNDATION, PROGRESS ON POINT (Feb. 2008), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/pop15.2performanceright.pdf.
'See infra notes 10-34 and accompanying text.
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recording artists to collect foreign performance royalties that are currently
being withheld by foreign collecting societies. Broadcasters and public
performance venues in other countries that play American musical
recordings are typically required to pay performance royalties for those
recordings,9 but the societies that collect those royalties simply retain them,
due to the absence of material reciprocity.10
Enacting an expanded public performance right will enable the United
States to join the Rome Convention, which will trigger the requirement of
national treatment in most signatory countries,12 enabling U.S. record
9 Some countries, such as Canada, do not even bother to collect royalties on U.S.
recordings. See infra notes 124 30 and accompanying text.
10 Ensuring Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform
Parity for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 16-30 (2007) (statement
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright); Performers and Performance Rights in Sound
Recordings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 39 (1993) (statement of Jason S. Berman,
President, RIAA).
" Article 4 of the Rome Convention provides that signatory countries are obligated to
provide national treatment to foreign performers if (1) the performance takes place in
another contracting state, (2) the performance is incorporated in a phonogram that is
protected under Article 5 of the Convention, or (3) the performance is carried by a
broadcast protected by Art. 6 of the Convention. If the U.S. becomes a contracting state,
then a musician that performs on a recording made in the U.S. would qualify under both (1)
and (2). See Rome Convention, supra note 2, art. 4. Under Article 5(1), Rome Convention
countries must extend national treatment to foreign record producers if (1) the producer is
a national of another contracting state, (2) the first fixation of the record was made in
another contracting state, or (3) the phonogram was first published in another contracting
state. (National treatment also applies if the record was first published in a non-contracting
state, but was then published in a contracting state within 30 days.) However, signatories
may opt out of the publication criterion or the fixation criterion. See Rome Convention,
supra note 1, art. 5.
12 The Rome Convention currently has 91 signatories, including most of the major markets
for U.S. music (except China). See WIPO, Contracting Parties, Rome Convention,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang en&treatyid=17.
However, because of several options available to signatory countries, see supra note 12,
adherence to the Rome Convention does not guarantee full reciprocity in every case. For
example, France requires distribution of public performance royalties only in the case of
recordings made in France or another EU country. See Nathalie Piaskowski, Collective
Management in France, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS
192 & n.59 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2010); Law No. 92-597 on the Intellectual Property Code,
as amended by Laws Nos. 94-361 and 95-4, art. L. 214-1, L. 214-2, (1995) (Fr.), available
at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=127148, For this reason, American recording
companies, and most American recording artists, are unlikely to receive French public
performance royalties even if the U.S. recognizes a full public performance right and joins
the Rome Convention.
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companies and performers to claim their share of performance royalties
under the domestic laws of those countries. In practice, many foreign
collecting societies (frequently referred to as Collective Management
Organizations, or CMOs) have been willing to reciprocate even before
being legally required to do so. For example, even under the limited public
performance right created by §§ 106(6) and 114,13 SoundExchange has
already obtained reciprocal agreements for the exchange of digital
performance royalties with collecting societies in the United Kingdom
(PPL), the Netherlands (SENA), Brazil (UBC) (covering artists only), Spain
(AIE) (artists only), and Mexico (SOMEXON). Some other foreign CMOs
allow individual artists and record labels to register with them directly.14
Even among the Rome Convention countries, the laws and collecting
society practices pertaining to public performance royalties are not
identical. Because of these differences, individual collecting societies in
each country negotiate reciprocal arrangements with foreign societies on a
case-by-case basis. 15
Although the rule of national treatment also applies to signatories of the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 16-a treaty which the
U.S. has joined-countries are permitted to "opt out" of specific provisions
through the reservations process, and the U.S. has opted out of the public
performance right under Art. 15(3), except with respect to certain digital
transmissions. 17  Accordingly, to this extent national treatment does not
" 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2009).
14 Collect Foreign Territory Non-Terrestrial Performance Royalties,
http://a2im.org/2010/02/09/collect-foreign-territory-non-terrestrial-performance-royalties/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011); M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS
OF Music 75-76 (10th ed. 2007).
5 See, e.g., REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 95TH CONG., PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND
RECORDINGS, 198-99, 205 (Comm. Print 1978) (describing lack of reciprocity between
several Rome Convention countries due to differences in performance rights legislation).
16 See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 4, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-17 available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs wo034.html
[hereinafter WPPT].
1 The United States' instrument of ratification of WPPT provides:
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, the
United States will apply the provisions of Article 15(1) of the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty only in respect of certain acts of
broadcasting and communication to the public by digital means for which a direct
or indirect fee is charged for reception, and for other retransmissions and digital
phonorecord deliveries, as provided under the United States law.
WPPT Notification No. 8, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Ratification by
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apply, and other WPPT countries can, and do, withhold performance
royalties to the extent that the U.S. does not materially reciprocate.19
As the U.S. public performance right is expanded to accompany a wider
array of public performances, this will trigger reciprocity with respect to
larger amounts of foreign royalties that have heretofore been withheld. The
next section attempts to assess the amounts at stake, and how they might
influence the design and implementation of the expanded performance
royalty.
B. How Much is at Stake?
The magnitude of the worldwide public performance royalties
attributable to U.S. recordings is unclear. It has been reported that the total
worldwide performance royalties paid to record producers and performers
in 2007 was $1.2 billion.20 According to one source, some 60 percent of
the recorded music performed worldwide is attributable to U.S. record
companies and recording artists.21 Others have estimated that U.S.
performers and producers forego $70-100 million per year in foreign
performance royalties that are withheld by foreign collecting societies due
to lack of reciprocity.22 Another source puts the figure vaguely at $600
the United States of America (Sept. 14, 1999), available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/wppt/treaty wppt 8.html.
is WPPT, supra note 17, art. 4(2).
19 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
ON THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT ON THE
RECORDING AND BROADCAST INDUSTRIES 14 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0428r.pdf.
20 PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, VALUING THE USE OF RECORDED MUSIC 52 (2008),
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/Valuingtheuseof recorded music.pdf.
21 Performers and Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. 40 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings] (statement of Jason
S. Berman, President, RIAA). Another source reports that 40% of music distributed
worldwide comes from the United States. Joshua D. Levine, Dancing to a New Tune, a
Digital One: The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 20 Seton
Hall Legis. J. 624, 643-44 (1996). It seems likely that U.S. recordings make up a similar
percentage of worldwide public performances.
22 Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 1st Sess. 36 (2009) (statement of Paul Almeida, President, AFL-CIO); Keith
Holzman, Performance Royalties,
http://www.musicbizacademy.com/articles/lh royalties.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011)
(Register of Copyrights Mary Beth Peters estimates $70 million); Public Performance
Right for Sound Recordings (Fact Sheet), http://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/public-
performance-right-sound-recordings (estimating $100 million). In 1991, Jay Berman of the
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million "over the last several years."23 The wide disparity in these
estimates may result from any of several factors: the use of questionable or
out-of-date data, exaggeration by advocates of the expanded performance
right, currency fluctuations, differences in collecting and reporting
mechanisms (e.g., where performance royalties from audiovisual
transmissions may be lumped in with those from audio transmissions, or
where delayed distributions of amounts previously held back may have
24
artificially inflated the amounts distributed in a subsequent year) , or the
sheer difficulty of compiling worldwide data. Also, sources providing
figures in the lower range may be netting the incoming royalties against
outgoing royalties that will be owed to foreign record companies and
foreign performers under reciprocity arrangements, while those in the
higher range may be focusing on the loss to U.S. performers and record
companies, while ignoring the outflow from U.S. users to foreign rights
holders.
According to older data presented at the 1993 congressional hearings on
the performance right, the worldwide recording industry earned $125
million in performance royalties during 1991, mostly from Europe. 2 5
(None, of course, was from the United States.) Due to rapid changes in
European laws and collecting society practices during the last twenty years,
the amount of performance royalties being generated in Europe has steadily
increased.26 At the same time, the partial reciprocity arising from the 1995
enactment of the digital audio performance right in the U.S. means that,
after 1995, at least some of the foreign collecting societies that had
previously withheld such royalties from U.S. rights holders began to
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) told Congress that the U.S. recording
industry was being excluded from performance royalties in excess of $120 million. Digital
Performing Rights: Hearing on H.R. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of
Jason S. Berman, Chairman and CEO, RIAA); Copyright Protection for Digital Audio
Transmissions: Hearing on S. 227 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of Jason S. Berman, Chariman and CEO, RIAA); Stephen Koff,
Recording Artists and Radio Stations Fight Over Royalties, Air Play and Spin,
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2010/06/recordingartists and radio st.html
(quoting John Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange, setting the figure at $70-100
million per year).
23 KASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 14, at 65.
24 See AEPO-ARTIS, PERFORMERS' RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LEGISLATION: SITUATION AND
ELEMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT 26 (2009).
25 1993 Hearings, supra note 21, at 30 (statement of Nicholas Garnett, Director General,
IFPI). There was no indication of the nature of the public performances that generated
these revenues.
26 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 27-31.
227
Harvard Journal ofSports & Entertainment Law / Vol. 2
disburse them, leaving less money "on the table" in subsequent years.
Because some countries have been slow to develop webcasting,
simulcasting, and interactive services, and others have been slow to apply
their performance royalty requirements to such services,27 the amount of
these disbursements to U.S. shareholders has probably increased slightly in
recent years, and that increase could become more substantial in the future.
However, more recent data from Europe indicates that, in the aggregate,
webcasting, simulcasting, and interactive services are generating much
smaller royalties than terrestrial broadcasting and performances in public
venues. 28 This would indicate, then, that the failure to extend the U.S.
performance right to terrestrial broadcasting and performances in public
venues has prevented U.S. rights holders from collecting the vast majority
of performance royalties that have been generated in Europe.
In most European countries, performance royalties generated from
performances other than transmissions (for example, performances in public
venues) represent one-third to one-half of the total performance royalties
collected for the use of sound recordings.29 This suggests that expanding
the U.S. performance right to restaurants, bars, clubs, and retail
establishments that play recorded music, assuming that reciprocity is
thereby triggered, will greatly increase the foreign royalties collected by
U.S. performers and record producers.
On the basis of this rather disparate data, it is probably fair to say that
U.S. rights holders are currently losing several hundred million dollars per
year due to the lack of material reciprocity with major markets for U.S.
recorded music. If the performance right is not expanded, much of this
money will never reach U.S. shores. On the other hand, the loss suffered by
U.S. rights holders does not necessarily translate to an equally large loss to
the overall U.S. economy, since an expanded public performance right for
sound recordings will also generate a small outflow of royalties from U.S.
terrestrial broadcasters and public venues to foreign record companies and
recording artists.
The case for an expanded public performance right will be strengthened
if better data can be obtained. The ability to collect such data will be
helpful in the future as well, when U.S. performers and record producers are
eventually able to collect these royalties. That will happen, of course, only
if and when the expanded public performance right comes to fruition.
It is also important to note that the expansion of sound recording
performance rights to terrestrial broadcasts and, eventually, to other public
27 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 18-20, 26.
28 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 26.
29 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 27-31.
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venues will impose new costs on users within the U.S. - users such as
radio and television broadcasters, and the operators of public venues such as
bars, clubs, retail establishments, and restaurants. Many, probably most, of
these costs will indirectly be passed along to consumers, and some marginal
businesses that cannot pass along the increased costs may be unable to
continue operations. This has been a major political obstacle to expansion
of the public performance right. The expansion of the performance royalty
to encompass a much broader user base therefore must be done with
sensitivity to the differences between users. A nonprofit college radio
station, for example, should not be subjected to the same royalty as a large
commercial radio operation. Under current law, similar disparities-
between large and small webcasters, and between webcasters and satellite
or cable broadcasters-have repeatedly required legislative resolution, as
well as negotiated settlements, in the context of digital transmissions. 30
Thus, the expanded royalty scheme should discriminate carefully to avoid
skewing the marketplace in favor of larger operators.
Policymakers, and ultimately the public, must decide if the benefits of
the performance right outweigh these costs. The foreign royalties that will
be generated by the expanded performance right do not impose costs on
U.S. consumers and will produce a significant gain to U.S. creators as well
as the overall U.S. economy. However, the royalties generated by public
performances within the U.S. will simply shift wealth from one
group (consumers and business owners) to another (the creators of recorded
music).31 Whether this wealth shift is desirable depends on the value one
places on the services of recording artists and record companies. While the
prospect of major record labels making more money does not strike
everyone as a good thing, it is important to keep several things in mind: (1)
the royalty scheme can be structured so that a guaranteed share of the
royalty will go directly to performers (as is partially true even under the
'0 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 11Ith Cong., 1st Sess. (June 30,
2009) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)); Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008,
122 Stat. 4974, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 16, 2008) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)); Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002, 116 Stat.
2780, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 4, 2002) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)); see AL KoiN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 1491-94
(2010).
31 In addition, some small component of this wealth will leave the U.S., because it will be
payable to foreign artists and record companies whose recordings are publicly performed in
the U.S. This component, then, will not directly benefit U.S. consumers or creators.
Because foreign recordings represent only a small share of the recordings publicly
performed in the U.S., this outflow of funds will be dwarfed by the inflow of foreign
royalties.
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current version of § 114 32); (2) the major record labels have been, and
continue to be, instrumental in obtaining performance rights for both
producers and performers, and in developing methods for implementing the
royalty scheme; (3) small independent record labels also benefit from the
performance right; and (4) new technology and new business models are
making it easier for performers to self-produce and self-distribute, 33 so that,
in the future, even the label's share of the performance royalty is likely to
offer benefits to performers.
III. CURRENT LAW
This section provides a brief overview of the most important aspects of
the sound recording performance right under current law.
In the 1995 Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act
(DPRSRA),34 as amended in 1998, Congress recognized a narrow form of
public performance rights in sound recordings. Under §§ 106(6) and 114,35
the performance right applies only to digital audio transmissions-i.e.,
satellite radio, digital cable and satellite television music services, on-
demand digital music streaming, and webcasting (or simulcasting, in the
case of terrestrial radio stations that retransmit their programs over the
Internet). The right does not apply to terrestrial radio (i.e., FCC-licensed
AM or FM stations), or to performances in public venues such as bars,
restaurants, clubs, and retail stores; all of these are currently exempt from
the sound recording performance royalty.
The nonexempt digital services are divided into two categories:
interactive and noninteractive.36 Interactive services stream music on
demand; thus, the listener selects the particular recording he or she wishes
to hear at a particular time. The recording industry sought and obtained
greater control over these services, on the theory that they have greater
3 2
2 Under § 114, specified percentages of the statutory licensing fees must be paid to
featured and non-featured performers. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2). In contrast, the allocation of
interactive licensing fees is determined by the individual performers' contracts with the
record companies. Id. § I 14(g)(1).
' The trend toward self-producing is international in scope. See Letter from Fd6ration
Internationale des Musicians to the European Commission, Comments on the Notification
Published 17 August 2001 (Ref Case COMP/C2/38.014-IFPI) T 1.8 (Aug. 17, 2001),
available athttp://www.fim-musicians.com/eng/pdf/7_1 2 2 2.pdf.
34 Pub. L. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
' 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114.
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)-(3).
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potential to displace record sales.37 Accordingly, in order to obtain a public
performance license to perform a recording, the interactive service must
negotiate directly with the record company. 38 In contrast, noninteractive
services, such as satellite radio and most webcasters, are more like
traditional radio, and have less potential to displace record sales;
accordingly, they are eligible for a compulsory license under § 114(f).
(This arrangement prevents the record companies from exercising a veto
over noninteractive licensing requests; this alleviates the concerns of
songwriters and music publishers.)39 The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB)
conducts proceedings to set the statutory rate; proceedings to date have been
lengthy and complex, and, in some cases, controversial enough to require
congressional intervention. Separate royalty schemes have been developed
for different kinds of services; in some cases, the royalty is based on gross
revenues, while in others it is a flat fee per performance, based on audience
size. Once the rates have been set, any noninteractive service can perform
sound recordings if it registers for the license with the U.S. Copyright
Office, satisfies certain other statutory conditions, and pays the statutory
royalty. The statutory royalty is paid to SoundExchange, a nonprofit entity
spun off from the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA),
which distributes the royalties to record companies and recording artists.40
In the case of interactive services, the negotiated royalty is paid directly
to the record companies. Because the law does not require the record
company to share the royalty with performers, a performer's right to share
in the royalty depends on his or her recording contract.41 In contrast, for
noninteractive services, § 114(g) requires the compulsory license fee to be
split as follows (a duty carried out by SoundExchange): 50% to the record
company that produced the recording, 45% to the performer(s) featured on
the recording (an amount that must be calculated on a per-recording basis,
reflecting the actual recordings that were played), and 5% to escrow
37 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 30, at 1468.
38 Because § 106(6) designates the digital performance right as an exclusive right, and §
114(d)(2) specifies that the § 114(f) compulsory license applies only to non-interactive
digital performances, only the latter fall short of being true exclusive rights that are subject
to voluntary negotiation. Even the right to voluntarily negotiate interactive licenses is
limited; however, § 114(d)(3) limits the right of the record companies to enter into
exclusive interactive licenses.
'9 See, e.g., Digital Performance Rights: Hearing on H.R. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
(Statement of Wayland Holyfield, ASCAP) (expressing "gatekeeper" concerns).
40 See generally KOHN & KOHN, supra note 30, at 1468-1504 (2010).
41 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1); DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNow ABOUT THE
Music BUSINESS 310 (2009).
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accounts managed on behalf of nonfeatured performers. The 5% share for
nonfeatured performers is split equally between two independently
administered escrow accounts, one for musicians and one for vocalists, and
payments are disbursed from these accounts to nonfeatured performers
"who have performed on sound recordings" (not necessarily the specific
sound recordings that generated the royalties). 42 In order to make accurate
disbursements to featured performers and record companies,
SoundExchange needs to identify the specific recordings that have been
played by each music service, and how often they have been played.
Accordingly, to the extent it is technically feasible, each audio transmission
under the compulsory license must be accompanied by the identifying
information encoded on the sound recording (including, inter alia, the title
of the recording and the names of the featured performers). 43
IV. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS
In 2008, the Department of Commerce urged Congress to expand the
§ 114 compulsory license to include terrestrial radio transmissions, arguing
that this would: (1) level the playing field between satellite, Internet, and
terrestrial broadcasters, (2) increase the incentives for performers and
record companies to produce new recordings, and (3) make it possible for
U.S. record producers and performers to receive substantial amounts of
foreign performance royalties that have previously been held back by
foreign PROs.44 Public performance royalties would also replace some of
the mechanical royalties that record producers and performers have lost due
to the proliferation of unauthorized downloads. 45
The proposed Performance Rights Act (PRA)46 would extend public
performance rights to terrestrial radio broadcasts. Although the House and
42 17 U.S.C. § I 14(g)(2).
43 Id. § I 14(d)(2)(A)(iii).
44 See Letter from Cameron F. Kerry, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce, to
the Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (April 1, 2010), available
at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/ 111 /S379Apr01O10.pdf.
45 The expanded public performance right would not replace the mechanical royalties lost
by music composers and publishers as a result of unauthorized downloads; however, this is
only because music composers and publishers already receive public performance
royalties. Arguably, their performance royalties have played an important role in
diminishing the impact of their lost mechanical royalties, whereas the loss of mechanical
royalties by record companies affects their most important revenue stream.
46H.R. 848, 11Ith Cong. (2010); S. 379, 111th Cong. (2010).
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Senate Judiciary Committees approved their respective versions of the
legislation in 2010, and the legislation had the support of the Obama
Administration, neither bill proceeded to a floor vote. They are, however,
likely to be revived in the 112th Congress. 47
The House (H.R. 848) and Senate (S.379) versions of the bill are not
identical, but both include the following provisions:
The PRA will make the § 106(6) right applicable to all audio
transmissions, including not only satellite and Internet transmissions, as
under current law, but also terrestrial broadcasts.48 However, the right will
not extend to other public performances of recorded music, such as those in
clubs, restaurants, bars, and retail or other business establishments. Thus,
the PRA leaves intact the § 114(d) exemption for transmissions within
business establishments and transmissions to business establishments for
use in the ordinary course of business.4 9
The PRA also provides relief to smaller terrestrial broadcasters, giving
them the option to pay, in lieu of the statutory royalty that would otherwise
apply to its over-the-air nonsubscription broadcasts, an annual flat fee
determined by their gross revenues. 50 As discussed below, the Senate
version of this proposal offers a bit more relief to the lowest-grossing
broadcasters. Although both bills limit this relief to terrestrial broadcasters,
expanding this relief to small webcasters as well would foster the growth
and diversity of webcasting, especially in less commercial "niche" markets,
thus increasing the opportunities for artists (and songwriters) to find an
audience.
Under transitional provisions, the new statutory royalty for terrestrial
stations does not take effect for one year after enactment (three years, for
stations with gross revenues of less than $5,000,000 during the year
immediately preceding enactment).51 This delay in implementation allows
some time for broadcasters and rights holders to develop systems for
tracking usage, and for collecting, allocating, and disbursing royalties. 52
Outright exemptions apply to eligible nonsubscription transmissions of
47 The Obama Administration reiterated its support for the legislation in its
recommendations to the 112th Congress. ADMINISTRATION'S WHITE PAPER ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 17 (2011).
48 H.R. 848 § 2; S. 379 § 2.
49 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(C)(ii), (iv).
o H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1); S. 379 § 3(a)(1).
H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1); S. 379 § 3(a)(1).
Counterpoint Systems is a United Kingdom company that performs this service in
several countries. See generally COUNTERPOINT SYSTEMS, http://www.counterp.com (last
visited Mar. 4, 2011).
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(1) religious services and (2) incidental uses of musical recordings. 53
The rates and terms established by the Copyright Royalty Judges must
also include the option of a per-program license for terrestrial broadcast
stations that make "limited feature uses of sound recordings." 54
The PRA also makes a significant change in the way that performance
royalties are allocated to nonfeatured performers in the case of voluntarily
negotiated (i.e., nonstatutory) audio transmission licenses, which are the
licenses applicable to interactive transmissions. Under current law, a
nonfeatured performer is entitled to receive a share of these royalties from
the record company only if and to the extent that the performer's contract
with the record company calls for such payments; under this system, most
nonfeatured performers receive no payments at all.55 Under the PRA, the
record company must deposit 1% of the negotiated license fee for each
recording into the Intellectual Property Rights Distribution Fund of the
AFM and AFTRA (or any successor entity), which will then distribute the
fee to the nonfeatured performers who have performed on sound
recordings56 (presumably using the same system they currently employ for
distributing the nonfeatured performers' share of the statutory license
fees). 57 Along with these deposits, the record company must indicate the
amounts attributable to each licensee, and, for each sound recording
performed, the following information (but only if the information is
included in the licensee's reports):
(1) The name of the artist;
(2) The International Standard Recording Code (ISRC) of the sound
recording;58
(3) The title of the sound recording;
(4) The number of times the sound recording was transmitted; and
(5) The total amount of receipts collected from that licensee.
53 H.R. 848 § 3(b); S. 379 § 3(b).
54 H.R. 848 § 4; S. 379 § 4.
5517 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1)(B).
6 H.R. 848 § 6; S.379 § 6.
5 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(B) (using the same statutory language). The AFM/AFTRA
Fund's distribution methodology is described at
http://www.raroyalties.org/digital/guidelines.html.
5' The ISRC is an international ISO standard (ISO 3901) that identifies particular sound
recordings and music videos by their unique 12-character alphanumeric designations. The
ISRC registration authority is the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI). See generally ISRC - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD RECORDING CODE,
http://www.usisrc.org/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
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The AFM/AFTRA Fund will then distribute 50% of the deposited fee to
nonfeatured vocalists and 50% to nonfeatured musicians (after deducting
reasonable costs).59 Thus, under the PRA, nonfeatured performers will be
guaranteed at least a small share of the negotiated performance royalties,
even if their individual contracts do not call for such payments.
However, the PRA does not impose on licensees any legal duty to
provide the information listed in (1)-(5) above, even though the
AFM/AFTRA fund will need at least some of this information in order to
make accurate distributions to the nonfeatured performers. And if the
licensees omit any of this information from their reports to the record
company, then the record company does not have to provide it to the
AFM/AFTRA Fund. In other words, the record company has no affirmative
obligation to assist the AFM/AFTRA Fund in obtaining this information, or
any other information, for that matter.60
Rather than impose such a duty on licensees, the PRA requires the
record company (the "sound recording copyright owner") to "use
reasonable good faith efforts to include in all relevant licenses a
requirement to report" this information.61 There are potential problems
with this approach: (1) the record company has no incentive to make a
"good faith" effort to include such provisions in its negotiated licenses with
users; (2) even if the record company includes this reporting requirement in
a negotiated license, it has no incentive to enforce that requirement; and (3)
major record labels, and larger commercial licensees, will be in a better
position to comply with these reporting provisions than smaller labels (or
self-producing recording artists) and smaller licensees. Thus, the
AFM/AFTRA Fund may not receive all of the information needed to make
distributions, which may cause the Fund to incur additional expenses in
order to make accurate distributions; these expenses will further reduce the
total funds available for distribution. Thus, while the PRA's new
distribution method may be better than the current method (which allows
the record companies to use their superior bargaining power to retain these
royalties), it still falls short of guaranteeing that nonfeatured performers will
receive their legal share.
The PRA makes no change to the current rule regarding featured
performers' rights to receive a share of a negotiated (i.e., interactive)
performance royalty. Thus, their shares will still be determined by the
terms of their recording contracts, meaning that in most cases the record
59 H.R. 848 § 6; S.379 § 6.
60
"The sound recording copyright owner shall not be required to provide any additional
information to the Fund. . ." S. 379 § 6(1); H.R. 848 § 6(1).
6 H.R. 848 § 6(1); S. 379 § 6(1).
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company will retain their shares. 62
If a record company and a terrestrial broadcaster enter into a negotiated
license that covers transmissions that are also eligible for the § 1 14(f)
statutory license (that is, the compulsory license that applies to
noninteractive transmissions), then the statutory license distribution
mechanism for featured and nonfeatured performers takes precedence over
the mechanisms described above. In other words, the broadcaster must pay
50% of the total negotiated royalty to the agent designated to receive
statutory royalties under § 114(f) (i.e., SoundExchange), which then
distributes them among featured and nonfeatured performers in the same
manner as statutory royalties are distributed under current law (2 -1/2 % to
nonfeatured vocalists, 2-1/2% to nonfeatured musicians, and 45% to
featured artists). 63
Both bills recite (repeatedly) the same directive found in the current
statute 64-that sound recording performance royalties shall not be
considered in any governmental proceeding65 pertaining to royalties for the
public performance of musical compositions, which "shall not be reduced or
adversely affected in any respect as a result of the rights granted by §
106(6)."66 Clearly intended to address the objections of songwriters and
music publishers, this language underscores the continuing presumption that
the underlying musical works deserve greater protection than the recorded
performances of those works. Neither bill endorses a corollary rule for
protecting recording artists-that the performance royalties payable to
songwriters and publishers should not be considered in the determination of
performance royalties for sound recordings.
A. Provisions Unique to the House Bill
As an alternative to the statutory royalty, the House bill allows smaller
terrestrial broadcast stations the option of paying an annual flat fee based on
their annual gross revenues, according to the following schedule:
Annual Gross Revenues Annual Fee
62 S. 379 §6(); H.R. 848 § 6(1).
63 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)-(D).
64 Id. § 114(i).
6 The new bills add the mysterious phrase "or otherwise." H.R. 848 § 5(a), (c); S. 379 §
5(a), (c). Surely Congress cannot intend that parties engaged in voluntary licensing
negotiations for the use of recorded musical compositions will be legally barred from
considering the impact of the sound recording royalty.
6 S. 379 § 5; H.R. 848 § 5.
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<$100,000 $500
At least $100,000 but < $500,000 $2,500
At least $500,000 but < $1,250,000 $5,00067
In the case of public broadcasting entities,68 the fees are the same,
except that they top out at $1,000 per year for a station with annual gross
receipts of $100,000 or more.69
Section 7 of the House bill expresses congressional intent not to
interfere with the public interest obligations of broadcasters to local
communities, and Section 8 instructs the Copyright Royalty Judges, in
setting statutory rates, to consider their effect on the diversity of
broadcasters as well as performers and record labels, specifically:
(1) Religious, minority-owned, female-owned, small, and
noncommercial broadcasters;
(2) Non-music programming, including local news and information
programming; and
(3) Religious, minority or minority-owned, and female or female-
owned royalty recipients.70
B. Provisions Unique to the Senate Bill
Like the House bill, S. 379 allows smaller terrestrial broadcast stations
to pay an annual flat fee instead of the statutory royalty, and the amount of
the fee depends on the station's annual gross revenues. However, the
Senate version of the fee schedule offers greater relief to stations grossing
less than $50,000:
Annual Gross Revenues Annual Fee
<$50,000 $100
At least $50,000 but <$100,000 $500
At least $100,000 but < $500,000 $2,500
At least $500,000 but < $1,250,000 $5,00071
As in the House bill, the same fee schedule applies to public
67 H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1).
6' These are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 118(f).
69 H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1).
70 id. § 8.
S. 379 § 3(a)(1).
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broadcasting entities, but it tops out at $1,000 for stations with annual gross
receipts of $100,000 or more.72
Under current law, digital transmissions are eligible for statutory
licensing only if they are "accompanied, if technically feasible, by the
information encoded on that sound recording, if any," which identifies the
title of the sound recording, the featured recording artist, and "related
information, including information concerning the underlying musical work
and its writer." 73 This information facilitates the task of identifying the
parties who are entitled to share in the statutory royalties - the owner of
the sound recording copyright, the performers, and the copyright owner(s)
of the underlying musical work. The Senate bill, in a provision captioned
"Eliminating Regulatory Burdens for Terrestrial Broadcast Stations,"
eliminates this requirement for nonsubscription and noninteractive
broadcast transmissions.74 In other words, the Senate bill eliminates the
information-encoding requirement for most terrestrial broadcasters. This
recognizes that, when the means of transmission is not digital, the encoded
information is less useful because it cannot be transmitted.
However, neither the House nor the Senate version of the bill imposes
any duty on terrestrial broadcasters to maintain records of this information
in any other manner. While this may indeed reduce the regulatory burden
on these users, it increases the burden on the record companies and
performers-together with their agent SoundExchange-who need this
information in order to ensure that the statutory royalties are properly
allocated among the rights holders. This creates an information gap, and
some mechanism must therefore be developed to fill that gap. It will not be
possible to allocate statutory royalties accurately unless the licensees are
required to maintain logs of their musical transmissions and deliver these
records to the parties charged with allocating the royalty. This requirement
may be burdensome, especially on smaller stations. However, these stations
are already required to maintain logs - at least periodically - under their
blanket licensing arrangements with ASCAP and BMI. If ASCAP and BMI
are willing to cooperate with SoundExchange, it may only be necessary to
add additional information to those logs, identifying the particular sound
recordings (as opposed to merely the musical compositions). 7 5 Although
72 id
73 17 U.S.C. § I 14(d)(2)(A)(iii).
74 S. 379 § 2(d).
The accuracy of the data currently being collected for digital transmissions has been
questioned, which suggests that future legislation on neighboring rights should place a
greater priority on tracking mechanisms, for both digital and terrestrial broadcasts. See
Christopher Herot, John Simson of SoundExchange at Harvard Law School, CHRISTOPHER
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some of the burden of tracking usage may inevitably fall on the recording
industry, other countries have imposed recordkeeping requirements on radio
broadcasters that are far more rigorous than anything contemplated by the
PRA.76
V. LOOKING AHEAD: PUBLIC VENUES
Even if the PRA becomes law, there will still be a significant gap
between the public performance rights of performers and record producers
and those of songwriters and publishers. Most of the public performances
that fall into this gap are those which do not involve either digital or
terrestrial transmissions of sound recordings - in other words, on-site
performances of sound recordings in public venues, such as clubs, bars,
restaurants, and retail establishments, where the recorded music may serve
either as background music or as featured entertainment.
Under current law, public establishments are in the same position as
terrestrial broadcasters. To obtain the right to perform musical works, they
must negotiate with each of the three PROs representing songwriters and
publishers to obtain blanket licenses covering the entire catalog of music
controlled by that PRO. If they wish to perform recordings of these
compositions (as opposed to bringing in live musicians), they do not need
the consent of the record companies or recording artists.77
The PRA will eliminate this exemption for terrestrial broadcasters, but
retain it for public venues. While this is typical of incremental legislative
reform, there is no principled justification for continuing to exempt these
businesses, and eventually they, too, should be required to pay for the use of
these recordings. 78
HEROT'S WEBLOG (last visited Apr. 7, 2011),
http://herot.typepad.com/cherot/2008/04/john-simson-of.html (reporting on lecture by John
Simson, Executive Director of SoundExchange, who estimates that sampling methods used
by ASCAP and BMI missed 41% of artists and 26% of titles).
76 ReSound Engages Neilsen BDS to Track Commercial Radio Music Airplay in Canada
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.resound.ca/en/docs/press release 2010-09-27.pdf (noting that
Canada requires radio stations to report radio logs 28 days per year, while mandatory 365-
day reporting is the norm in most countries); COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, STATEMENT
OF ROYALTIES TO BE COLLECTED BY SOCAN, RE:SOUND, CSI, AVLA/SOPROQ AND
ARTISTI IN RESPECT OF COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS 330-31 (2010), http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/2010/20100709.pdf.
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (stating that the public performance right under 17 U.S.C. §
106(4) does not apply to sound recordings).
78 The Register of Copyrights has consistently adopted this position. See, e.g., Ensuring
Artists Fair Compensation: Updating the Performance Right and Platform Parity for the
21s' Century: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 115 (2007) (Statement of
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Expansion of the right to public venues would raise some of the same
questions that must be resolved for terrestrial broadcasters. How will the
rates be set-by compulsory license, or through individual or collective
negotiation? The typical use of recorded music in public venues is more
analogous to terrestrial broadcasting or noninteractive digital music services
than it is to interactive music services, because it usually does not allow the
listeners to dictate which songs will be played when. Like terrestrial radio,
it is also more ubiquitous than interactive music services and does not
provide the kind of perfect listening experience that threatens to displace
record sales. Therefore, Congress would almost certainly adopt the
compulsory license model.
With respect to recordkeeping, however, the expansion of the
performance right to public venues will be more problematic than its
expansion to terrestrial radio. In order to allocate royalties (compulsory or
negotiated) among the various rights holders, the agent in charge of
collecting and disbursing those royalties (SoundExchange or a similar
entity) will need some way to determine which recordings have been
played, and how often. If the burden of monitoring usage falls on the rights
holders and their agent, this will be even more burdensome than the task of
monitoring radio broadcasts. It would be virtually impossible to monitor
thousands of individual venues, geographically disparate, with widely
varying music usage (e.g., dance clubs versus grocery stores), to the degree
that would be necessary to develop a database from which broader
nationwide usage could be extrapolated. How, then, will royalties be
allocated? The PROs for songwriters and music publishers do not require
venue operators to maintain records of the music they play, relying instead
on radio airplay and other proxies to estimate frequency of performance. 79
Under the PRA as currently proposed, however, terrestrial broadcasters will
not be required to maintain records of the recordings they play. Thus, the
convenient "radio proxy" will not be available. As suggested earlier, this
deficiency in the PRA should be addressed, so that terrestrial broadcasters
are required to engage in at least some degree of recordkeeping in order to
make allocations of the sound recording royalty as accurate as possible.
Alternatively, operators of large commercial venues (for example, large
retail chains) could be subject to a limited recordkeeping requirement-
perhaps limited to a few days per year-and their records could be used as
proxies for the smaller venues. Collecting societies outside the United
MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights); Internet Streaming of Radio Broadcasts:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of David Carson, General
Counsel, United States Copyright Office).
79KOHN & KOHN, supra note 30, at 1281.
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States have developed their own methods for estimating usage of sound
recordings by public venues as well as broadcasters; these methods may
be useful models for the United States.
Under their blanket licensing arrangements with ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC, public venue operators normally pay a license fee that reflects their
revenues and the nature of their business (because music plays a greater role
in some businesses than others-e.g., dance clubs versus grocery stores). If
the compulsory license is extended to public venues, then the CRB will
need to take similar factors into consideration by establishing different rate
schedules for different kinds of establishments. There is tremendous
variation in the nature of the public venues that perform music, the ways in
which they use that music, and the extent to which that music contributes to
their gross revenues. In contrast, most digital music services and terrestrial
radio broadcasters perform the sole function of delivering audio
performances to listeners. The current compulsory licensing scheme for
digital audio services, and the proposed extension of that scheme to
terrestrial broadcasters, distinguishes between services only on the basis of
revenues and audience size; this is a nearly "one size fits all" approach that
simply will not work for public venues.
VI. PROBLEMS IN SETTING RATES
A. Procedures
To the extent that the CRB or the courts become involved in setting the
rates for public performance royalties, § 114(i) of the current law82 and the
corresponding provisions in both PRA bills provide that the public
performance rates for sound recordings shall not be considered in any
proceeding to adjust the public performance rates for musical compositions.
This language responds to the long-standing concern that any royalties that
become payable for sound recordings will reduce the royalties paid for
80 For the methods used in France by the Societe Civile des Producteurs Phonographiques
(SCPP), see FAQ, SCPP,
http://www.scpp.fr/SCPP/Home/LASCPP/questionsfr%/C3%/A9quentes/tabid/240/Default.a
spx (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
si In France, for example, the Socit6 Civile des Producters de Phonogrammes en France
(SPPF) calculates royalties differently for state-owned radio, private radio (further
differentiated according to the amount of nonmusical programming), television stations,
discotheques and other recreational facilities, and background music. Code de la Proprit6
Intellectuelle, R6mundration Equitable Dispositions R6glementaires SPFF [hereinafter
SPPF Remuneration], http://www.sppf.com/legislation.php?rub=2.
82 17 U.S.C. § 114(i).
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musical compositions. It is questionable, however, whether rate-setting
bodies should be constrained in this way.
Neither § 114(i) nor the corresponding provisions in the PRA addresses
the opposite scenario: whether the performance rates payable for musical
compositions should be considered in any proceeding to set the rates
payable for sound recordings. In fact, in every congressional hearing
addressing the performance right in sound recordings, and even in the
international discussions that led to the Rome Convention, opponents of the
performance right in sound recordings have repeatedly argued that
broadcasters and other users already pay for the rights in the musical works,
and cannot afford to pay for both sets of rights.83 This illustrates the
widespread perception that authors' rights deserve priority over neighboring
rights. This perception is rooted in the same thinking that prevented the
United States from recognizing any copyright at all in sound recordings
until 1971-that sound recordings are not creative works of authorship, but
mere mechanical fixations. This same perception is responsible for sound
recording rights being labeled mere "neighboring rights" in most other
countries, where they have generally received a shorter term of protection
than the term applicable to copyrighted works. 84
Under current law, the rate-setting procedure for § 114(f) compulsory
licenses for performing sound recordings is completely separate from the
procedure that establishes the royalty for performing the underlying musical
compositions.
For musical compositions, public performance royalties in the United
States are negotiated between the users (terrestrial broadcasters, digital
83 See, e.g., RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 1221; Performance Rights Act,
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. 142-43, 153-54 (2009)
(Testimony and Prepared Statement of Steve Newberry, CEO of Commonwealth
Broadcasting); Performers' and Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 71-79 (1993) (Testimony and Prepared Statement of Edward 0.
Fritts, National Ass'n of Broadcasters); Performance Rights in Sound Recordings:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin ofJustice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 82 (1978) (Testimony of John Bayliss, Combined
Communications Corp.); John R. Kettle Ill, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer:
Global-Harmonization - And the Need for Congress to Get in Step with a Full Public
Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1041, 1053 & nn. 52-54 (2002).
84 In the European Union, for example, the copyright term is the life of the author plus 70
years, while the term of protection for live performances and sound recordings is only 50
years. See Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 on the Term of Protection for Copyright and Certain Related Rights, OJ L
372, 12-18 (Dec. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Directive 2006/116/EC].
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services, and operators of public venues such as clubs and restaurants) and
the three performing rights organizations (PROs) that provide collective
representation for songwriters and music publishers-ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC. The degree of negotiation varies from individually negotiated
deals to take-it-or-leave-it blanket licenses (although the blanket licensing
fees of ASCAP and BMI can be challenged in the federal "rate court" in the
Southern District of New York). For noninteractive audio streaming
services (such as webcasting and satellite radio), the royalty rate is, in
practice, based on a percentage of revenue, subject to minimums. Smaller
services simply pay the rate required under standard licenses available on
the PRO websites, while larger users such as Yahoo! and MySpace
negotiate separately with the PROs. 86 For interactive streaming and bundled
services, such as those offered by Napster, Rhapsody, MySpace, and
Yahoo!, negotiations between the users and ASCAP failed, and resolution
required the intervention of the courts as well as the CRB.87
For sound recordings, current law calls for a public performance royalty
only in the case of digital audio transmissions (specifically, those which are
not altogether exempt from the § 106(6) right). Under the DPRSRA, the
rate-setting method depends on the nature of the service.89 In the case of
interactive music services (those that stream listener-selected recordings on
demand), record companies negotiate directly with the services. While the
negotiated royalties are not publicly disclosed, they are generally structured
as a percentage of advertising revenue or subscription fees, pro-rated for
each recording, and based on the number of plays. In case the music
service fails to generate sufficient revenue, some deals call for a per-play
minimum (usually a fraction of a penny). 90 In the case of noninteractive
satellite radio and webcasting services, the compulsory license under
§ 1 14(f) 91 applies, and the royalty rate is determined by the CRB.92
Thus, under current law, the performance royalty rates for the use of
sound recordings and musical works in digital transmissions are set
independently, using two completely different methods-collective
8 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 30, at 1263.
86 PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 246-47.
87 Id. at 247-49; KOHN & KOHN, supra note 31, at 753-64, 776-80, 1269-71; see also 37
C.F.R. § 385 (2011).
" The exemptions are listed in 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1). Under current law, they include,
inter alia, terrestrial broadcasts and certain transmissions used in business establishments.
The Performance Rights Act would repeal the exemption for terrestrial broadcasts.
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114.
90 PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 167.
91 17 U.S.C. § I14(f).
92 17 U.S.C. §§ 803-805.
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negotiation on the one hand (subject to judicial appeal), and administrative
rulemaking on the other. This means that there is no place in the rate-
setting process to consider the cumulative burden on the music services, and
how that burden should be split between the different groups of rights
holders. Because the fees are set independently, there is no single body
with the authority to determine whether this outcome makes sense or to
make the necessary changes if it does not.
Under the proposed Performance Rights Act, the compulsory license
under § 114(f) would apply to terrestrial broadcasters, who would then pay
the statutory rate for sound recordings, and the blanket license fees for
musical works. 93 As in the case of digital music services, the rates would
be set independently, and would bear no rational relationship to one
another; once again, § 114(i), if not repealed, would preclude consideration
of the sound recording royalty in any governmental proceeding (e.g., a
judicial appeal) to determine the royalty for musical works.
Ideally, rate-setting legal bodies should be free to consider both
royalties in every rate-setting proceeding, to ensure that the cumulative
burden on music services and broadcasters is reasonable and not subject to
major fluctuations over time. Rather than have two separate rate-setting
processes for non-interactive services such as webcasters, terrestrial radio,
and satellite radio, there could be a single process-either a collective
negotiation or an administrative proceeding by the CRB. The negotiation
process could involve joint negotiations, with the record companies,
performers, songwriters, and publishers on one side, and the music services
and broadcasters on the other. If the royalties for each user group were
entirely independent, however, the joint negotiation would be cumbersome
and ultimately ineffective, because it would truly be a three-way
negotiation. In contrast, if Congress were to legislate that the royalty rates
for musical works and sound recordings must be equal, or that they must
maintain some other pre-set ratio (e.g., 2/3 to the songwriters and
publishers, and 1/3 to the record company and performers, or vice versa),
this would eliminate conflict between the two groups of rights holders, in
which case the joint negotiation process could be highly effective. (The
question of the relative ratios of the two royalties is discussed in the next
section.)
Alternatively, rate-setting could be left to separate negotiations between
collective societies and users. Under this approach, record companies and
performers, through their collective representative (currently
SoundExchange, whose passive role in the compulsory licensing scheme
would have to be transformed into an active role as a negotiator, unless the
93 H.R. 848; S. 379.
244
Issue2
RIAA undertakes this role directly), would engage in the same negotiation
process, with the same option for judicial or administrative review, that is
currently used to establish the performance royalty for musical works
(where the rights holders are represented by ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC,
depending on their chosen affiliation). Under this approach, however, the
failure of one group of rights holders to reach an agreement with users
could stymie the ability of the other group to move forward under their own
agreement. In other words, if the songwriters and publishers reached an
agreement with broadcasters, but negotiations between the broadcasters and
the record companies stalled, the broadcasters would not be able to play
recordings of the music they had licensed until the negotiating impasse was
resolved. Thus, a system of separate negotiations does not appear to be
feasible.
If the law were changed so that the rate for public performances of
musical compositions were set administratively, by the CR3, rather than
through blanket licenses appealable to the rate court, it is possible that the
rates for musical compositions and for sound recordings could be set
through separate administrative proceedings. Under § 114(i) and its
equivalents in the PRA, the proceeding to set sound recording royalties
could take account of musical composition royalties, but not vice versa.
However, it would be impossible for a single tribunal, while engaged in
setting the rate for the musical composition royalty, to completely ignore
the sound recording royalty it had established, albeit in a separate
proceeding. Thus, the separation envisioned under § 114(i) would be
unsustainable. Even if § 114(i) were repealed, holding two separate rate-
setting proceedings would be inefficient. In the United Kingdom, where
tariffs for public performances of musical compositions and sound
recordings are set through separate proceedings, the most recent tariff
announced by the neighboring rights society (Phonographic Performances
Ltd, or "PPL") went into effect immediately, but was significantly reduced
by the Copyright Tribunal five years later (after a lengthy administrative
proceeding and an appeal to the High Court), necessitating refunds to the
licensees of five years of overpayments.94 In the U.S., some of the early
rate-setting proceedings under § 114 have also been drawn-out affairs. 95
Thus, if separate administrative proceedings must be undertaken for each
type of royalty, the delays(and costs)are likely to multiply.
Another solution is to utilize a joint rate-setting procedure, giving the
94 See Louisa Albertini, Phonographic Performance Ltd v. British Hospitality Association:
PPL Case Exposes Difficulties with Aspects of the Copyright Tribunal's Jurisdiction, ENT.
L.R. 2010, 21(5), 201 (2010).
95 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 30, at 1490-94; PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 308.
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CRB the authority to set rates for both the underlying musical works and the
sound recordings. This would eliminate the possibility that stalled
negotiations with one set of rights holders could block the effectiveness of
an agreement reached with the other set of rights holders. This approach
has been used in Canada, where the Copyright Board of Canada has held
joint rate-setting proceedings to set the tariffs for each class of users.96 This
approach has the advantage of efficiency, and would help to protect users
from becoming subject to excessively burdensome cumulative royalties. It
could only be accomplished, however, by repealing § 114(i). In addition, if
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC are compelled to submit their licensing rates for
CRB approval, this arguably undermines the strength of the exclusive
public performance right, converting it to little more than a remuneration
right (although songwriters could still, in theory, choose not to allow their
works to be performed at all). Of course, the antitrust consent decrees
under which ASCAP and BMI operate already subject their blanket
licensing rates to judicial review;97 thus, the collective enforcement of
songwriters' and music publishers' exclusive public performance right
already resembles a remuneration right rather than a true exclusive right.
When the sound recording performance right is eventually extended to
include public venues, the operators of these venues will face the same rate-
setting dilemma that currently plagues digital services and threatens to
overwhelm terrestrial broadcasters. Operators of public venues may be
stymied by incompatible demands from the two sets of rights holders, and
overburdened by the cumulative royalties. The same solutions will need to
be explored-either joint negotiations, or a joint administrative
proceeding-with Congress determining, as a policy matter, the mandatory
ratio between the rates for musical works and those for sound recordings.
B. Relative Amounts of the Two Royalties
If a more coordinated rate-setting process can be developed, either
through joint negotiations or by enlisting the Copyright Royalty Board,
there will remain the substantive question of "How much?" And,
specifically, how should the performance royalties for sound recordings and
for musical works compare?
If the question of relative rates were left entirely to negotiation, it is
unlikely that the respective rights holders would reach agreement. It would
be more efficient to establish the relationship between these rates
96 See COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, supra note 76.
97 See Lionel S. Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the
"Economic Realities" ofBlanket Licensing, 3 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1 (1983).
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legislatively. While this might involve a contentious congressional hearing
(and would necessitate the repeal of § 114(i)), it would not have to be
repeated every time the rate schedule comes up for reconsideration. The
relative entitlements of composers and publishers, on the one hand, and
producers and recording artists on the other, present an important question
of copyright policy, one that should be resolved through the legislative
process, with significant input from all of the interested parties, rather than
renegotiated repeatedly in multi-party adversarial regulatory proceedings.
It is therefore worthwhile to consider some of the arguments that might
be-and in some cases, have been-presented to support conflicting claims
as to the "correct" relationship between performance royalties for musical
compositions and those for sound recordings. As discussed below, many of
these assertions involve questionable factual claims that have neither been
proved nor disproved, and may not lend themselves to proof at all.
Arguments that the composers' and publishers' performance royalty
should be higher than the sound recording performance royalty include:
1. Musical compositions make a more valuable contribution to
creative expression than individual recordings of those
compositions. One could argue endlessly whether this is true or
not. How is the value of each contribution measured? If it is
measured in the short term, one would focus on what drives
consumer demand for particular recordings. Do people listen to
recorded music because of the composition or the particular
performance? Surely the answer is both, and the exact
proportion would constantly vary, depending on the individual
listener, the song, and the performance. Should relative values
be measured in the long term instead? Does the creation of a
musical composition always, or usually, make a greater long-
term contribution to creative expression than the creation of a
particular recording? Surely this question is unanswerable.
Relative rates should not be set based on a questionable
judgment that the contribution of the writer is more important
than the contribution of the performer.
2. It is more difficult (or less enjoyable) to write a good musical
composition than it is to create a good recorded performance, so
writers need more incentive than performers in order to do their
work. According to this argument, sound recording royalties
would increase a songwriter-performer's potential to earn money
from performing, and this would reduce his or her incentive to
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compose.98 This argument requires several questionable
assumptions. It assumes that large numbers of good songwriters
are also good performers. (To the extent that the skills do not
co-exist in the same people, a difference in the relative
incentives to employ the two skills will probably not cause one
person to switch to an activity in which he or she consistently
fails to succeed. A great songwriter who cannot sing a note will
not switch to performing, and a great singer who is unable to sell
her original compositions will probably not persist in composing
simply because the royalty rate is higher.) It also assumes that
most songwriter-performers would prefer performing to
composing, and that any additional time spent performing
decreases the time they would otherwise spend composing (as
opposed to other activities). There are no data to back up these
assumptions. Finally, if a songwriter-performer cannot make a
living as a performer, that artist may abandon the music business
altogether (enrolling in law school, perhaps) and never achieve
his or her potential as a songwriter.
Arguments that the sound recording performance royalty should be the
higher of the two include:
1. The public is more interested in a particular artist's recording
than in the underlying musical composition. This argument was
advanced by PriceWaterhouse Coopers in a report prepared, not
surprisingly, for IFPI and eight recording industry collecting
societies. 99 Certainly, most people are not indifferent to whether
they listen to Dolly Parton's rendition of "I Will Always Love
You" or Whitney Houston's version of the same song. Of
course, this is simply the converse of the first argument
discussed above, and is subject to the same objections. Some
people will be indifferent to the singer. Sometimes it depends
on the circumstances. And surely Whitney Houston's fans don't
love all of her recordings equally; they will prefer some songs to
98 See Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in Sound Recordings: A
Policy that Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2007)
(presenting this argument as a reason for providing no public performance rights for sound
recordings at all); Emily F. Evitt, Money, That's What I Want: The Long and Winding
Road to a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.,
Aug. 2009, at 13 (critiquing Sen).
99 See PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, VALUING THE USE OF RECORDED Music 2 (2008),
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/Valuing the use of recorded music.pdf.
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others. Even where a consumer is strongly motivated to prefer
one performer's rendition over another's rendition of the same
composition, this may change over time. Some day Whitney
Houston may be forgotten, and another performer's cover
version of the same song may top the charts. A performance that
is strongly preferred in the short term may be forgotten after a
few years, and yet the underlying composition may continue to
be covered by future performers because it has continuing
audience appeal. Thus, this assertion is as unsupportable as its
converse.
2. The costs and risks of producing and marketing a recording are
higher than those for the production and marketing of the
underlying music. This argument was made, apparently
seriously, in the same PriceWaterhouse Coopers report. 00
However, the report provided no data to support this claim.
How does one quantify the "costs and risks" of creating a
musical composition? It may not involve renting a studio and
sound equipment and paying for session musicians and
engineers, but there are costs involved in developing the
necessary skills to compose, and there are opportunity costs and
risks involved in devoting one's time to composing as opposed
to pursuing a more secure occupation. While record companies
incur manufacturing, advertising, packaging, and shipping costs,
songwriters also incur costs in marketing their works to
publishers, and publishers incur costs in marketing these works
to record companies and other potential licensees. Furthermore,
by focusing only on costs, and ignoring returns, this argument
exaggerates the record company's need for a performance
royalty. The focus on cost alone ignores the significant
difference in the non-performance revenues that the record
company and the songwriter derive from their respective
efforts - that is, revenues from record sales. Since the record
company keeps the lion's share of the revenues from record
sales, any performance royalty it receives is simply an additional
level of compensation. The copyright owners of musical works
receive only a small mechanical royalty from record sales (less
than 2 cents per minute of playing time, typically split 50/50
between the songwriter and publisher), and there is no longer
much of a market for sheet music; thus, the songwriter's need
i00 Id.
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for performance royalties is arguably much greater than the
record company's.
3. The sound recording royalty typically must be split among more
people - i.e., the record company, the featured performers, and
the nonfeatured performers. Therefore, a larger aggregate sum
is needed in order to compensate each person adequately. The
royalty for the underlying composition, however, does not go to
just one person either. It is split between the publisher (and
perhaps a subpublisher) and the songwriter, or several
songwriters if the work is jointly authored. Furthermore, the
split in each case is not necessarily equal. Depending on the
statutory scheme and the recording contracts, the record
company may retain 50% of the performance royalty, and
nonfeatured performers as a group may receive only 5% to be
shared among the entire group. This is the case under the
current statutory royalty scheme for digital audio transmissions
in § 114.101 Also, this argument looks only at one side of the
equation (rewards) without considering the other side (costs).
Finally, it ignores the cumulative effect of receiving
performance royalties for numerous works. If a record company
releases numerous recordings during a one-year period, the
cumulative effect of the royalties will be significant, even if the
per-recording royalty is small. A songwriter, in contrast, may
write only a few songs in the course of a year.
4. A sound recording may be in demand for only a short period of
time before its popularity fades. A single musical work,
however, can be recorded many times by many artists, and thus
may have a longer revenue-producing life. Therefore, the sound
recording should receive higher royalties to make up for its
shorter useful life. Even if this is true, it contradicts the first
argument in favor of higher sound recording royalties - that
sound recordings deserve a higher royalty because the public is
more interested in a specific recording than in the underlying
composition. This argument also leads to the bizarre conclusion
that recordings of low quality should receive higher royalties
than recordings of high quality, because the latter will have a
longer useful life in which the royalties can accumulate.
Issue2
5. The career of a performer is typically shorter than the career of
a composer. This could be true, and data might be obtainable to
prove it. Because so much music is youth-oriented, successful
performers often "age out" of their popularity as they become
too old for their fans, or the attention of their fans is drawn
elsewhere. Also, the carefully cultivated image that resonates
with today's audience may be difficult to shake off when it
ceases to be fashionable, and the performer may not necessarily
be successful at "re-inventing" herself as fashions change. This
could be an argument for giving larger performance royalties to
performers than composers. On the other hand, successful
performers can also generate (even if during a short career)
substantial revenues from tours, endorsements, merchandise, and
personal appearances, opportunities typically not available to
composers. This argument may also be somewhat circular; if
performers could anticipate a future filled with performance
royalties, they might be more selective in their recording
projects and their tour commitments, and might be less inclined
to suffer from overexposure or burnout so early in their careers.
Finally, even if the short-career argument does have some merit
for performers, it does not apply to record companies, which will
receive performance royalties continually from an inventory of
recordings that is constantly changing to appeal to new
audiences.
6. Cable firms have to pay 41.5% of gross revenues for their
motion picture programming, and the rate that a music service
pays for recorded music should be comparable. The RIAA
reportedly made this argument during the proceeding that
established the 1998 statutory licensing fee for digital
subscription music services.1 02 Not surprisingly, this apples-to-
oranges comparison gained no traction, and the rate was set at
6.5%.
Not one of these arguments based on "first principles" or abstract
notions of merit or justice is sufficiently persuasive to rebut the
countervailing arguments. Perhaps the default rule should simply be that
the rates for musical works and sound recordings should be equal.
102 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 14, at 73.
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VII. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In the European Union, even though there has been some degree of
harmonization with respect to performance rights in sound recordings, there
is still significant variation in the scope and implementation of the rights.103
Royalties are usually set through negotiations between the users and the
collecting societies representing the rights holders; if they are unable to
agree, there is usually a route for administrative or judicial intervention. 104
In some countries, the law requires the royalties to be split equally between
the record companies and the recording artist; even where this is not
required by law, it has emerged as the customary practice.105 Collections
and distributions are handled by the collecting societies; in most cases this
is mandated by law.106 Currently, European laws are not uniform on the
question whether the performer's share of the royalty can be waived in the
recording contract. When waivers are allowed, they are routine, due to the
weak bargaining position of performers, and the record company generally
receives the performer's share. Concern over this practice has led to calls
for legislative change.107
Collecting societies in the EU are, in general, subject to a high level of
government regulation and oversight. os In Luxembourg, the public
performance tariffs are established by administrative action rather than
negotiation.109 Elsewhere in the EU, the tariffs are determined by the
collecting societies, usually through negotiations with user groups.110
However, in most EU countries the societies are required either to publish
103 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 18-20, 32.
104 Id. at 21; KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, THE COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS IN
EUROPE: THE QUEST FOR EFFICIENCY 82-83, 104, 119-23 (2006) (report prepared for the
European Parliament), http://www.keanet.eu/report/collectivemanpdffinal.pdf.
'o' AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 21-23, 33; David Laing, The Economic Importance of
Music in the European Union, Soundscapes.info, Vol. 2 (July 1999),
http://www.soundscapes.info.
106 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 21; KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 105, at 69,
89-96.
107 AEPO-ARTIS, supra note 24, at 7-8.
10s KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 104, at 89-130; Daniel J. Gervais, Collective
Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An International
Perspective, 50-53, 57-58, 60-63 (2001), http://works.bepress.com/daniel gervais/28.
109 KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 104, at 112; Law of April 18 on Copyright,
Neighboring Rights, and Databases, art. 47 (2001) (Fr.).
110 See KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 104, at 73, 76, 103-17.
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their tariffs or to submit them to a government agency.111 In Portugal, the
tariffs are subject to standards of reasonableness and proportionality.112 In
Poland, they must be approved by the Copyright Commission. 113
In Europe, the royalty rates for sound recordings are usually set
independently of the rates for musical works (often as a percentage of gross
income), although in some cases (mostly nonbroadcast performances) they
are set as a percentage of the latter. 1 14 In some EU countries and elsewhere,
the collecting societies for musical works and for sound recordings work
jointly to increase efficiency-for example, sharing a common log book for
tracking usage and allocating royalties to their members,115 or allowing one
society to collect the royalties for both.116
In Canada, as in the EU, performance royalties for both sound
recordings and musical compositions are subject to a high degree of
government regulation. Collecting societies are required to submit their
proposed tariffs to the Copyright Board for approval.11 7 The Board then
publishes the proposed tariffs for public comment, and is required to take
those public comments into account in determining whether to approve or
reject the proposed rates. 119 In conducting its evaluation, the Board has
broad authority to "take into account any factor that it considers
111 Id. at 76, 103-17.
112 Id at 114; Law No. 83/2001 of 3 August (Collecting Societies of Copyright and Related
Rights), ch.1, art. 4(e) (2001) (Port.).
113 KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, supra note 104, at 121; Law of February 4, 1994 on
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, art. 108-3 (1994) (Pol.).
114 See, e.g., Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong. 183, 187, 197 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearing)]. For example, this method applies
to background music services in France. See SPPF Remuneration, supra note 82.
115 1978 Hearing, supra note 114, at 182.
116 See Will Page, ECADonomics: Understanding Brazil's Unique Model of Collective
Rights Management, ECONOMIC INSIGHT, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.prsformusic.com/economics.
"' Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, art. 67.1(1)-(2) (2011) (Can.) [hereinafter Canada
Copyright Act]. The 1997 amendments added neighboring rights to Canada's copyright
regime. Maryse Beaulieu & John Lorinc, CCC-DAMI Research Project on The Working
Conditions of Creators in Quebec and Canada, Summary Report at 19 (1995). Three years
of lobbying by the Canadian music industry preceded this enactment. About CIMA: Our
History, CANADIAN INDEPENDENT Music ASSOCIATION (CIMA), http://www.cimamusic.ca
(last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
i" Canada Copyright Act, supra note 117, at art. 67.1(5).
119 Id. at art. 68(1).
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appropriate.,,120 In the case of broadcasters, however, a statutory rate of
$100 (CAD) applies to the first $1.25 million (CAD) of advertising
revenues; this reduced rate applies only to the neighboring rights tariff, not
the tariff for the underlying musical compositions.121 Once approved, the
final tariffs must be published.122
While the public performance rate for sound recordings in Canada is
lower on paper than the rate for musical compositions, the effective rates
are equal (after the first $1.25 million in revenues). This is because U.S.
sound recordings make up 50-55% of the commercial radio repertoire in
Canada.123 Radio stations (and other users) are not required to pay a
performance royalty on these U.S. recordings.124 Because the sound
recording tariff is based on the station's gross revenues, the rate of the tariff
must be reduced to reflect the ineligible portion of the repertoire. This
equality in effective rates is not accidental; the collecting societies in
Canadal25 participate in joint tariff hearings,126 and the practice of the
Canadian Copyright Board has been to establish equal tariffs.127 However,
Artistl, one of three organizations representing musical performers, has
objected to the equality in rates, arguing that the sound recording royalty
120 Id. ar art. 68(2).
121 Id at, art. 68.1(1)(a)(i). Community broadcast systems are subject to a flat $100 (CAD)
yearly tariff as well. Id. at Art. 68.1(1)(b). This example of inequity between neighboring
rights tariffs and songwriter/publisher tariffs has been noted. Beaulieu & Lorinc, supra
note 118, at 103 ("It seems to be received opinion that copyright takes precedence over
neighbouring rights.").
122 Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 118, at art. 68(4).
123 Neighbouring Rights, CANADIAN HERITAGE,
http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/ 1274283867016/1274275915148 (last updated May 19, 2010).
124 COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, supra note 76, 309; New Music Tariffs in Canada
Could Spell New Tariffs for Lodging Industry Worldwide, INTERNATIONAL HOTEL &
RESTAURANT Ass'N (2005), http://www.ih-ra.com/html-
ihra/ihra31/131 Alert New Mu.htm (suggesting that Canadian hotels would switch to
using American sound recordings for background music to avoid otherwise-applicable
sound recording tariffs). .
25 Among others, these include Re:Sound (formerly NRCC), an umbrella organization
representing the rights holders in sound recordings, and SOCAN, which represents the
copyright owners of the musical works.
126 COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, supra note 76, 15. The tariffs are not totally equal,
however, because Re:Sound is allowed to collect its full royalty rate for commercial radio
stations only to the extent that their revenues exceed $1.25 million CAD.
127 Statement of Case of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, Re: Consolidated
Commercial Radio Tariffs Proceeding (2008-2012), Copyright Board of Canada 8 (Sept. 5,
2008), http://www.cab-acr.ca/english/research/08/subsep05O8.pdf. This is said to be
"[b]ased on the notion that neighbouring rights should be equal in value to musical
work ... performing rights." Neighbouring Rights, supra note 123.
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should be set independently, and should be higher than the royalty for
musical works.128 Performers are entitled to 50% of the sound recording
royalty. 129
In the United Kingdom, the public performance tariffs for musical
compositions and sound recordings are set independently by the respective
PROs-PRS for the former and PPL for the latter-but each tariff may be
reviewed by the Copyright Tribunal to determine whether it is "reasonable
under the circumstances."1 30  The rate-setting methods used by the two
PROs are completely different, making rate comparisons difficult. 131
Because user groups have not disclosed the amounts they are actually
paying under the two tariffs,132 it is impossible to state whether the "bottom
line" figure is higher for the PRS tariff or the PPL tariff. The Copyright
Tribunal considers the musical composition tariff to be a relevant
comparator for determining whether a proposed sound recording tariff is
reasonable. 133 Because the UK has no provision analogous to § 114(i),
presumably the converse is permissible as well. The Copyright Tribunal
has in fact considered the PRS tariff in determining whether a proposed
PPL tariff is reasonable. 134 In a recent proceeding, however, the Tribunal
decided that the PRS tariff was a less relevant comparator than the previous
PPL tariff, and therefore rejected most of the increase that PPL had
proposed.135 The Tribunal's explanation of its reasoning leaves the
impression that, despite the difficulty of drawing direct comparisons due to
differing methodologies, the PRS tariff is indeed somewhat higher than the
PPL tariff.136
128 Neighbouring Rights, supra note 123.
129 Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 117, at art. 19(3); Musicians' Neighbouring Rights
Royalties Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.mnrr.ca/faq.html#2 (last visited Apr.
14, 2011).
130 Phonographic Performance Ltd v. The British Hospitality Ass'n & Ors, [2009] EWHC
209 (Ch) 17 (Feb. 12, 2010).
13 For example, even where both organizations base their licensing fees on the square
footage of an establishment, they use different increments, so that no apples-to-apples
comparisons are possible. Id. 24-33, 96-99.
132 Id, 57-59.
133 Id. 61, 93-95.
134 Id. 73-75.
135 Id.
136 Id. 193-99.
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VIII. CHALLENGES
As the preceding discussion has shown, expanding the scope of the
public performance right in sound recordings is not a simple undertaking.
The task of rate-setting alone will require fundamental policy decisions
affecting the interests of rights holders, licensees, and consumers. As
discussed below, however, even when the substantive and procedural issues
pertaining to rate-setting have been resolved, additional implementation
challenges lie ahead.
A. Tracking Usage
As noted earlier,137 § 114(d) currently requires digital broadcasts to
include, "if technically feasible," the information encoded in the sound
recording that identifies the title of the recording and the featured recording
artist; while this requirement helps to track usage of recordings via digital
transmissions, it will not be helpful in tracking their usage in terrestrial
broadcasts or in non-broadcast situations such as public venues. Because
the statutory royalty mechanism does not allow SoundExchange or any
other collecting agent to negotiate the terms of the royalty with the
individual users, some mechanism will be needed to determine which
recordings are being played in these settings, and how often. The ability to
impose such a requirement may or may not be within the authority of the
CRB,138 and may require further legislation.139
B. Building, Maintaining and Sharing a Database of Rights Holders
It will also be necessary to build and maintain a database of recordings
that identifies the producers and featured performers, and maintains an
updated record of their contact information. If ownership of the copyright
changes hands, this information will also have to be updated. This database
must be accessible not only to the agent in charge of collections and
disbursements, but also to the stakeholders-producers and performers-in
order to verify that their information has been properly recorded.
Identifying the ownership of sound recording copyrights may be
137 See supra text accompanying note 73.
138 The CRB currently has the authority to dictate the form and manner of recordkeeping
with respect to the statutory license for digital transmissions under § 114(f)(4). See
KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 14, at 75; 37 C.F.R. Part 370. If Congress expands
the scope of the statutory license, it should expand the Board's authority over
recordkeeping commensurately.
139 See notes 75-76, 79-80, supra, and accompanying text.
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complicated by several factors. Courts have yet to resolve the question
whether work-made-for-hire provisions in recording contracts are
enforceable, and if they are not, beginning in the year 2013 there may be a
wave of terminations in which the ownership of those copyrights will revert
to the performers.140 Performers may find themselves jointly owning these
copyrights with others who performed in the recording, or jointly with the
record company.
Federal copyright law does not currently protect sound recordings made
in the United States before February 15, 1972.141 Although some of those
recording may be protected under state copyright laws until 2067,142 state
law protection does not render them eligible for performance rights
royalties under the federal scheme.143  However, recent legislative
proposals would restore federal copyright in these older recordings, in
which case they too would be entitled to performance royalties.144 The
producers and featured performers on those older recordings would then
have to be identified, along with their contact information, and added to the
database. Because there will be gaps in the data, the disbursing agent will
also have to establish procedures for dealing with funds that cannot be
disbursed, perhaps holding them in reserve for some period of time in hopes
that the rights holder can be located, and, if not, dedicating them to some
other use.14 5 Due to the length of the copyright term for sound recordings
in the U.S., and the fact that some of these recordings will be more than a
few decades old, there may be a significant amount of missing data; an
informational campaign by the music industry and the musicians' unions
would encourage the successors and heirs of producers and performers on
140 See Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 375 (2002).
141 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
142 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1998).
14'' The public performance right for sound recordings under 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) applies
only to "the owner of copyright under this title," and the italicized language can only refer
to Title 17 of the U.S. Code.
144 Congress has directed the Register of Copyrights to undertake a study on the desirability
and means of extending federal copyright protection to pre-1972 sound recordings.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, NOTICE OF INQUIRY; FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOUND
RECORDINGS FIXED BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1972, 75 Fed. Reg. 67777-01 (Nov. 3, 2010).
145 This is analogous to the "orphan works" problem in the Google Books settlement.
Foreign collecting societies already have well-established mechanisms for undisbursable
sums, largely because they have been withholding the royalty shares that would go to U.S.
rights holders were it not for the lack of reciprocity. In some cases, these funds are
contributed to cultural programs or to programs aimed specifically at assisting the
development of young musicians. See Piaskowski, supra note 13, at 193-94 (describing
practice in France).
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these recordings to come forward and be added to the database.
Another challenge in building and maintaining an accurate database of
rights holders will arise from the restoration of U.S. copyrights in foreign
sound recordings under § 104A,146 including those made prior to 1972.
Identifying these rights holders, and obtaining updated contact information,
will in some cases be complicated, due to the age of the recordings and the
fact that the rights holders are located overseas. One question to be
resolved is whether these parties will be required to file a "Notice of Intent"
under § 104A(e) in order to be able to claim their shares; such a
requirement will simplify the task of maintaining the database, but will
place a burden on the foreign rights holders. If the parties cannot be
identified and located, the funds due to them will be undisbursable. If §
104A(e) applies, and it probably will, foreign collecting societies and other
musicians' organizations may be able to assist by publicizing this
requirement and encouraging foreign rights holders to take the necessary
steps to claim their rights. Because the term of protection for sound
recordings can be considerably shorter outside of the United States
(typically lasting fifty years),147 it is possible that foreign collecting
societies will have failed to maintain updated information for older sound
recordings that nonetheless continue to generate performance royalties in
the United States, which will make distributions to these foreign rights
holders more challenging. Much of this burden will fall on the foreign
collecting societies. However, in order to remit the correct amount of
royalties to each foreign collecting society, the U.S. collecting society will
need to know at least where the fixation took place, and the nationality of
the performers, in order to determine how much to remit to each foreign
collecting society. To the extent this information is not readily available,
some funds may be undisbursable, and the question will arise of what to do
with the undisbursable amounts attributable to these "orphan works."
In addition to the administrative challenge of identifying the rights
holders for each recorded work and maintaining updated contact
information for those parties, organizing this information into a database
accessible to the collecting societies presents a technological challenge.
Significant progress toward this goal has already been made at the
international level. A consortium of international organizations
representing rights holders, including, among others, the International
Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) and the
International Performers Database Association (IPDA), has created an ISO-
146 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1998).
147 See, e.g., Directive 2006/116/EC, supra note 85; Capitol Records v. Naxos of America,
Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004); KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 14, at 440.
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certified global standard (Draft ISO 27729), called the International
Standard Name Identifier (ISNI), for identifying contributors to a wide
variety of creative works, including music recordings. The ISNI is similar
to the ISBN used for books. The ISN International Agency, a London-based
nonprofit organization established in December of 2010, will assign the 16-
digit ISNI numbers (through registration agencies) and administer the
database. The ISNI database is scheduled for initial release in mid-2011. 148
C. One Collecting Society or More?
Currently, SoundExchange is the sole collecting and disbursing agent
for the § 114(f) statutory royalty.149 Tracking usage of specific recordings
is relatively easy because the necessary information is encoded in the digital
recordings. However, as the performance right expands to terrestrial
broadcasts and public venues, identifying which recordings are played, and
how often, will become more difficult and less precise. Sampling,
logbooks, and selective monitoring will help, but a certain amount of
judgment and extrapolation will be required, as it is in the case of musical
works. Songwriters and publishers can choose to affiliate with ASCAP,
BMI, or SESAC, and one basis for choosing one of these societies over
another is the methodology that the society uses to make these judgments.
Another consideration is the administrative expense that the society
subtracts before disbursing funds to the rights holders.150 For the same
reasons, producers (especially independent producers) and featured
148 See How to easily identify all digital content contributors?,INTERNATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND COMPOSERS (CISAC),
http://www.cisac.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011), INTERNATIONAL STANDARD NAME
IDENTIFIER (ISNI), http://www.isni.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); KRASILOVSKY &
SHEMEL, supra note 14, at 450; Juha Hakala. International Standard Name Identifier: An
Introduction, TECHNOLOGY WATCH REPORT, http://metadaten-
twr.org/2010/02/03/international-standard-name-identifier-an-introduction/#more-280.
The ISNI must be distinguished from the ISRC, which identifies only the recording. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text. It also differs from the International Standard
Musical Work Code (ISWC) (ISO 15707), an 11-character code that identifies a specific
musical composition, and which is administered by the ISWC International Agency. See
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD MUSICAL WORK CODE (Iswc), http://www.iswc.org/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011).
149 An aspiring competitor, Royalty Logic, represents some labels and performers in
receiving royalties from SoundExchange, but does not yet have the legal authority to
compete with SoundExchange in tracking usage and collecting royalties directly from
users, and must depend on SoundExchange's usage data. See Music REPORTS,
http://www.royaltylogic.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
150 See Nigel Parker, Music Business: Infrastructure, Practice and Law 203-05 (2004);
PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 235; KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 14, at 142.
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performers may want a choice of organizations with which to affiliate.
AFM and AFTRA may be helpful in this regard.
If multiple collecting and disbursing societies develop, they will need
to share access to the database of rights holders. If the expanded public
performance right requires broadcasters and venue operators to maintain
records of the recordings they play, then in order to avoid burdening smaller
webcasters, broadcasters, and venue operators with excessive
recordkeeping, the societies might agree to share access to the logbooks (if
any) that the amended law requires these parties to maintain.
D. Exceptions and Limitations
Any royalty scheme that covers a diverse array of users-small and
large broadcasters, "niche" webcasters, major retail chains, and small "mom
and pop" establishments-must be sensitive to the economic differences
between these users. If the statutory or negotiated royalty rates under the
expanded performance right are not responsive to the needs of nonprofits
and other small operators, these users will not be able to deliver
performances to consumers, and consumers, in turn, will have fewer
choices. For example, college radio stations should receive special
accommodations under the royalty scheme.
The hospitality industry will likely respond to an expanded public
performance right by seeking a concomitant expansion of the § 110(5)
privilege. Under current law, § 110(5)(B)15 1 permits a large percentage of
bars, restaurants, and retail establishments to play radio or television
broadcasts of music for their patrons without paying a public performance
royalty to the owners of the musical compositions.152 These industries
would certainly demand a similar privilege with respect to sound
recordings. While the current version of § 110(5)(B) has been held to
violate the United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement,153 an
expansion of this provision to encompass sound recordings appears to be
less problematic, because TRIPS does not require the United States to
17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2005).
See Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R para. 6.118-6.133 (June 15, 2000) (finding that a substantial majority of
U.S. eating and drinking establishments, and a large percentage of other business
establishments, qualify for the § 1 10(5)(B) exemption).
153 Id. The TRIPS Agreement is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, which is administered by the World Trade Organization. The United
States became a party to TRIPS in 1994, as part of the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, art. III & annex IC (April 15, 1994).
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provide any public performance rights in sound recordings.154 Nor would
an expanded version of § 11 0(5)(B) prevent the United States from adhering
to the Rome Convention; Article 15 of Rome specifically permits a
signatory country to recognize the same limitations for neighboring rights
that it recognizes for copyrights. Even if an expansion of § 110(5)(B) did
not violate international agreements, however, it could provide an excuse
for neighboring rights countries to deny full reciprocity to U.S. performers
and record companies seeking to collect their share of foreign performance
royalties.
E. Section 114(i)
As noted earlier, the broadening of sound recording public
performance rights will highlight the infirmity of § 114(i), which bars any
governmental body from considering the sound recording royalty in setting
the rate for the musical composition royalty. When the DPRSRA was
enacted, § 114(i) was a political accommodation that was necessary to
defuse opposition from songwriters and music publishers.156 Those same
groups will likely vehemently oppose any effort to repeal or weaken §
114(i), as evidenced by their success in retaining this provision in both
versions of the proposed PRA. Indeed, the entrenched interests of
songwriters and composers appear to present the single greatest political
obstacle to implementing a full performance right for sound recordings.
Yet there is no policy justification for retaining this provision, which favors
one group of rights holders over another based solely on being the first to
achieve their "place at the table." Section 114(i) stands in the way of
establishing a fair and efficient rate-setting procedure. As evidenced by the
recent UK proceedings, it is possible to establish performance royalties for
one group of rights holders while giving little weight to the cumulative
effect of the two royalties on users. 157 However, such a procedure increases
the risk of unreasonable and economically unjustified burdens on users.
154 Article 14(1) of TRIPS protects the rights of performers in their live musical
performances, and Article 14(2) protects the reproduction rights of record producers.
However, nothing in Article 14 addresses a public performance right in sound recordings.
55 Rome Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(2).
156 Copyright Protection for Digital Audio Transmissions: Hearing on S. 227 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 4 h Cong. (1995) (statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights).
157 See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
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F. A Note on Derivative Works
One other category of performances that would be encompassed by a
full public performance right consists of performances of sound recordings
that have been incorporated into motion pictures or other audiovisual works,
including theatrical or television films. Under current law, negotiated
master use licenses permit the integration of the sound recording into a
derivative work; however, such licenses do not automatically confer
public performance rights on the licensee, because the licensee does not
need a public performance license under current law. However, if a full
public performance right is granted to sound recordings, incorporating such
recordings into films that are performed in movie theatres (or other public
venues, such as airplanes) or on television, or which are streamed by a
service such as Netflix, will necessarily implicate this right.
Addressing this additional right in the master use license should not be
problematic on a prospective basis; because these licenses are voluntarily
negotiated and are not subject to judicial or administrative oversight, the
parties are free to reach any agreement as to the licensing fee. Indeed,
adding this additional right to future licenses may have only a modest effect
on the typical licensing fee: because record companies will probably share
only a small portion of this fee with recording artists (as determined by their
individual recording contracts), any increase in the master use license fee
will be pure profit to the record company, with no increased expense.
A more difficult question is presented by existing master use licenses.
Because record companies and filmmakers negotiated these licenses at a
time when there was no public performance right in sound recordings, these
licenses typically do not convey a public performance right. If and when
record companies become entitled to a full public performance right as a
matter of law, it is conceivable that they would demand additional royalty
payments as a condition of the continued public performance of the existing
films in which their recordings have been incorporated. Copyright owners
of motion pictures would be likely to resist these demands, and if the parties
could not reach a voluntary settlement, then some judicial or legislative
solution would be required.
To some degree this problem may be avoided if the duty to obtain a
public performance license is placed on the party responsible for the
performance, whether that is a movie theatre (unlikely in the case of older
films) or other public venue operator, a television broadcaster, or a video
streaming service.
1 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 30, at 1545; RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 398 (2005).
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Alternatively, it can be argued that incorporating a sound recording into
an audiovisual work causes the incorporated recording to lose its separate
character as a sound recording, because it is now part of the audiovisual
work.159 Under this analysis, public performances of the audiovisual work
would not constitute public performances of the sound recording; thus, the
existing master use license would continue to be sufficient without any need
for further negotiation.
However, if neither of these solutions is adopted, then the copyright
owner of an existing motion picture will face the problem of obtaining
permission for future public performances of any sound recordings
incorporated in that work. In that case, § 104A of the Copyright Act offers
a possible model for resolving this problem. Under that provision, creators
of derivative works that incorporated public domain foreign works before
the copyright in those foreign works was restored (in 1996 and later years)
are entitled to continue exploiting those derivative works if they pay
"reasonable compensation" to the owner of the copyright in the restored
work.160 If the parties cannot agree on the amount of this compensation,
then it will be determined by a federal district court.161 One objection to
applying this paradigm to existing master use licenses is that, if voluntary
negotiations do not succeed, these disputes will place further demands on
the limited resources of the federal district courts. If these disputes begin
to crowd the federal docket, then a statutory license may be needed-for
example, a set percentage of the film's future performance revenues.
One final possibility is that the legislation that expands the public
performance right for sound recordings could expressly exclude pre-
existing master use licenses. Unlike the restoration of copyrights under §
104A, recognition of a public performance right in sound recordings is not
mandated by TRIPS. Thus, creating a limited exception for pre-existing
master use licenses would not violate TRIPs. Like an expansion of §
11 0(5)(B), however, it could undermine efforts to establish reciprocity with
other Rome and WPPT signatories.
IX. CONCLUSION
The policy debate surrounding a public performance right in sound
recordings has been well rehearsed for over forty years. Despite a strong
consensus in favor of the right, the political will has materialized slowly.
159 Under the Copyright Act, the definition of a sound recording specifically excludes "the
sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
160 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A).
161 Id. § 104A(d)(3)(B).
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The still-pending Performance Rights Act is the next incremental step.
However, it is limited to broadcast performances, and excludes on-site
performances of recorded music in public venues (clubs, stores, bars,
restaurants, and other venues where recorded music is played). Because it
falls short of the full performance right recognized by most Rome
Convention countries, it will fail to trigger full reciprocity from those
countries, depriving U.S. rights holders of substantial overseas royalties.
While the PRA piggybacks on the existing statutory royalty mechanism
created for digital subscription transmissions and webcasting (already
complex in itself), enacting a full performance right that encompasses
dispersed public venues will present even greater implementation
challenges. As public performance rights are broadened, the number of
licensees will increase, and the nature of their music-related activities and
revenue streams will be more diverse. This will make rate-setting and data
collection more challenging; one size will no longer fit all.
Further complicating the task is the proliferation of rights holders due to
changes in the music industry and its legal environment. The dominance of
major record labels is slowly declining as musicians embrace new
alternatives for funding, promotion, and distribution. Increasingly, these
artists will retain the copyrights in their recordings. Identifying all of the
rights holders for each sound recording, and maintaining an accurate
database of their contact information, will present formidable challenges.
Expanding the performance right presents significant political
challenges. However, the expanded right is more likely to become a reality
if the recording industry can develop a plan to overcome the
implementation challenges. Thus, producers and recording artists should be
prepared to address practical objections to the expanded right by having a
plan for implementing the right in a manner that is sensitive to the best
interests of rights holders, service providers, and consumers.
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